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HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
of this work I remain convinced not only that artists and scien-
tists can work together effectively to create new, mutually relevant, 
knowledge but that it is very important they do.
The paper will start by introducing the topic that was the 
subject of the collaborative investigations, which I term “visual 
indeterminacy.” This is an area of great significance in the his-
tory of art and, as I hope to show, is potentially of considerable 
neuroscientific interest also. In setting out the background, I 
will describe how I became aware of the phenomenon of visual 
indeterminacy, how other artists have explored its effects, and 
how I have tried in my own work to produce images that are 
indeterminate. I will then describe some of the neuroscience 
that relates to the phenomenon, and the collaborative studies 
I have undertaken with neuroscientists and psychophysicists to 
investigate responses to such images. Finally, I will consider some 
of the implications of this work for art–science interdi sciplinarity 
in general.
The percepTual phenomenon of visual 
indeTerminacy
Visual indeterminacy is a perceptual phenomenon that occurs when 
a viewer is presented with a seemingly meaningful visual stimulus 
that denies easy or immediate identification (Pepperell, 2006). I 
first became aware of it as an undergraduate art student watching 
the silent German Expressionist film The Cabinet of Dr Caligari 
(Weine, 1920), which is known for its non-naturalistic sets and 
highly contrasting monochromatic lighting. About three quarters 
of the way through watching the film something remarkable hap-
pened: the image suddenly became unrecognizable. Although I 
could clearly see the screen was full of shapes (there was no problem 
inTroducTion
The last decade or so has seen substantial interdisciplinary activ-
ity between the arts and sciences, with many scientists applying 
knowledge and methods from their own areas in order to gain 
new insights into how art is made and appreciated (Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 1999, 2000, 2004; Zeki, 1999; Livingstone, 
2002; Solso, 2003; Martindale, 2006). Occasionally scientists have 
worked closely with art historians to share ideas and approaches 
(Freedberg and Gallese, 2007; Onians, 2008). One of the factors 
motivating this new collaborative spirit is the realization that art-
ists have made certain discoveries about the way the human brain 
works that are only now being uncovered by scientists. According to 
Zeki (1999, p. 2): “…most painters are also neurologists.” Cavanagh 
(2005), another eminent vision researcher, talked of “the artist as 
neuroscientist.” Given that for many centuries artists have been 
intensively studying the way the world is perceived it is perhaps not 
surprising they have come to understand certain features of the way, 
for example, we sense objects, color, form, or depth. Through their 
investigations artists have left a permanent record of their findings 
in all the countless works of art in museums and galleries around 
the world. The task of unpacking all this deposited artistic knowl-
edge and reconciling it with our current scientific understanding of 
perception and cognition is vast. Which is why the recent collabora-
tive activity is to be welcomed, despite the great inter-cultural and 
methodological challenges it poses. The challenges will be addressed 
later in this paper. First, though, I will discuss my own experience 
as an artist collaborating with scientists in the study of art. As will 
be seen, the process of working closely with scientists has raised 
a number of issues of the kind I believe many collaborators face 
when trying to work across two quite distinct traditions. As a result 
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doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00084with my vision as far as I was aware) they did not form a meaning-
ful scene, and I was left struggling to identify the forms before me. 
Figure 1 shows two stills from the movie, the first at the moment 
of “non-recognition” and the second from a few frames on, when 
a figure leans up from a desk, and I was once again able to make 
out what was depicted.
This 5-s sequence had a big impact on me, with repercussions 
that continue to this day. Unlike normal visual perception where 
the world is full of objects we readily recognize, in this short lapse 
of time my usual conceptual grip on the world failed. I remember 
the experience as marked by a mild form of anxiety and bewilder-
ment combined with an active struggle to make sense of what I was 
seeing. I’ve since realized that such experiences are not uncommon. 
Indeed, I’ve spoken to many others who report similar momentary 
lapses of recognition. I have certainly been aware of it in my own 
perception many times since.
One of the most vivid televisual memories of my childhood 
was a segment in an early evening quiz show called Ask the Family, 
broadcast in the UK in the 1970s, which pitted two families 
against each other in a test of general knowledge and observa-
tion. The section of the show in question involved an everyday 
object being presented in close up or from an unusual angle. As 
the camera pulled out to reveal the object in full the families 
raced to identify it as quickly as possible. Part of the reason, I 
suspect, this piece of television trivia is remembered so readily 
by those who saw it is because it was one of the rare occasions 
in popular culture where an image was deliberately presented 
in such as way as to be unrecognizable. When faced with such 
images we seem to be compelled to determine their meaning, 
so paying a different kind of attention to them than we would 
with easily recognizable views of the same thing. These days we 
might even enroll the help of the online community to resolve 
visual conundrums of this kind. The image in Figure 2 was an 
image posted on a university bulletin board by a confused IT 
manager who wanted help in identifying what his Christmas-
themed biscuit represented.
Visual indeterminacy can be defined, then, as the perceptual 
experience occurring in response to an image that suggests the pres-
ence of objects but denies easy or immediate recognition. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that being confronted with such images arouses 
a need to determine what is depicted, so that additional attention 
is given in order to resolve the conundrum.
a brief survey of visual indeTerminacy in arT 
hisTory
The allure of indeterminate images has not escaped the attention 
of artists, who have frequently exploited their capacity to perplex 
audiences. In the first major study of unrecognizable images in 
art, Gamboni (2002) tracked the use of indeterminacy in works 
stretching deep into art history showing the way artists deliber-
ately included elements or passages within paintings that con-
founded the viewers’ capacity to identify what they saw. A famous 
example is found in a work made in the late eighteenth century 
by Joseph Wright of Derby titled Experiment on a Bird in an Air 
Pump (National Gallery London, 1768). The painting depicts a 
scientific demonstration of the effect of oxygen deprivation on a 
bird, and is generally rendered with immaculate clarity. Yet there 
is a strange object floating in a backlit jar prominently positioned 
in the foreground of the scene. Ever since the painting was first 
exhibited people have wondered what this object is. It has been 
variously labeled a bird’s carcass, a skull, and a pickled organ, but 
there is still no universally agreed interpretation (Schupbach, 1989, 
Figure 1 | Two stills from The Cabinet of Dr Caligari showing (left) the moment of non-recognition and (right) the moment of recognition some 5 s later.
Figure 2 | image of an “indeterminate biscuit” taken from a university 
web site, which included the caption: “What on earth is this???? Found 
in a package of Cadbury’s Festive Friends chocolate biscuits in the office 
this afternoon. What on earth is it supposed to be? Santa? reindeer? 
Snowman????? Do tell if you know!” Image reprinted with permission.
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ridiculed its imprecision and scornfully asked: “What does that 
canvas depict?” (Leroy, 1874).
In fact, as far as Monet was concerned the function of his paint-
ing was not to obscure but to faithfully depict the appearance of the 
world, in other words what he saw rather than what he knew to be 
out there in front of him. A painting like one of the many views he 
made of Rouen Cathedral in the 1890s is not so much a depiction 
of the cathedral’s walls themselves than the light reflected by those 
walls (House, 1986, p. 221). It is up to us as viewers, according to 
the theories of vision popular among artists in Monet’s day, to 
read into those patterns of light the form of the cathedral from 
which they were derived using our own conceptual resources. This 
is what Gombrich (1960, p. 161) referred to in Art and Illusion 
as the “beholder’s share” of the pictorial bargain, the contribu-
tion viewers supply to the meaning of the image from their own 
imaginations. Gombrich (1960, p. 250) noted that Turner’s great 
champion, the art critic, and theorist John Ruskin, urged artists to 
paint only what arrives at the “childish” or “innocent eye,” that is, 
the eye as a recorder of “flat stains of color, merely as such, with-
out consciousness of what they signify – as a blind man would see 
them if suddenly gifted with sight.” Monet subscribed to such a 
view himself, remarking that he “…wished he had been born blind 
and then suddenly gained his sight so that he could have begun to 
paint in this way without knowing what the objects were that he 
saw before him.” (Nochlin, 1966, pp. 35–36).
As a young man in 1895 the Russian artist later to be credited 
with introducing abstraction to European art, Wassily Kandinsky, 
saw one of Monet’s series of paintings depicting sunlit haystacks 
in a Moscow gallery. Unable to recognize what the painting was 
of, he later recounted:
And suddenly for the first time I saw a picture. That it was a hay-
stack (or rather, a grain stack), the catalog informed me. I did not 
recognize it … And I noticed with surprise and confusion that the 
picture not only gripped me, but impressed itself ineradicably upon 
my memory. Painting took on a fairy-tale power and splendor. And, 
albeit unconsciously, objects were discredited as an essential element 
within the picture. (Parsons and Gale, 1992, p. 255).
A similar experience is recounted in a passage from Kandinsky’s 
Reminiscences when he returned to his studio at dusk and was aston-
ished to see “an indescribably beautiful picture, pervaded by an 
inner glow” standing against the wall (Lindsay and Vergo, 1982, pp. 
369–370). In it he could discern “only forms and colors” and no 
comprehensible objects. It was in fact one of his own rather impres-
sionistic paintings turned on its side, the subject of which he had 
failed to recognize. Kandinsky realized the potential of objectless 
images to evoke a remarkable perceptual response. He subsequently 
spent many years refining a visual language through which this 
insight could be expressed.
Among contemporary artists, Gerhard Richter is somewhat 
unusual in that he works in a number of quite distinct styles. He 
is particularly recognized for both his photo-like images, precisely 
rendered, and his generally larger abstract works, which he fre-
quently produces by an almost chance-like act of scraping, leav-
ing the final effect to the unpredictable interaction between paint 
and tools.
pp. 346–347). It has generally been assumed that the artist delib-
erately fashioned the object in this way in order to add an extra 
dimension of interest for audiences.
One artist who did more than most to exploit the artistic pos-
sibilities of visual indeterminacy was J. M. W. Turner, the English 
painter associated with the Romantic movement of the early nine-
teenth century and famous for his atmospheric landscapes and sea-
scapes. In spite of his now titanic reputation, in his lifetime Turner 
was often vilified for producing what were seen as unreadable and 
indistinct works, which many critics thought flouted good taste 
and artistic probity (see Figure 3). It is surprising that the images 
Turner exhibited publicly and which were complained about most 
vociferously, such as the landscapes of the early 1800s, appear to 
us to now as quite clear and distinct. Of one such painting another 
artist commented: “…so much was left to be imagined that it was 
like looking into a coal fire, or upon an Old Wall, where from 
many varying and undefined forms the fancy was to be employed 
in conceiving things” (Gage, 1975, p. 450).
Had critics seen some of the works Turner did not show in pub-
lic, such as the highly indeterminate Interior of a Great House: The 
Drawing Room, East Cowes Castle of around 1830, now in the Tate 
collection in London, they would very likely have been bewildered. 
Historians are still unclear about the subject or the motive for the 
painting, and indeed even when inspected closely it is impossible 
to make out all but a fraction of the objects depicted. It has been 
described as being in a “state of dissolution” (Butlin and Joll, 1984, 
p. 282) being executed with a vigor and freedom hardly seen in 
Turner’s contemporaries.
It is interesting to speculate what was going on in Turner’s mind 
that led him to create such works, and in the minds of the public 
who struggled to read even his more recognizable pieces. We do 
know, however, that his paintings had an impact on the 30-year-old 
Claude Monet when he visited London in 1870 to avoid conscrip-
tion into the Franco-Prussian War, where he saw Turner’s work for 
the first time (House, 1986, p. 113). Monet soon echoed Turner’s 
atmospheric images in a painting made in 1872, Impression, Sunrise, 
the title of which, when exhibited in 1874, gave the Impressionist 
movement its name. This rather sketchy rendering of Le Havre 
Figure 3 | A nineteenth century caricature satirizing J. M. W. Turner’s 
painting methods, which were regarded by many of his contemporaries 
as producing indistinct or unrecognizable scenes.
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et al., 2002). Even given the scantest of clues – such as two dots and 
a curve – we can interpret things, like faces, almost instantaneously. 
Alternatively, if the information in an image is too noisy or distorted 
we simply categorize it as a “meaningless” abstract texture, and 
make no attempt to discern objects in it (see Figure 5).
The challenge in making artworks that are truly indeterminate, 
then, was to achieve a fine balance between recognizability and 
abstraction in order to excite the inquisitiveness of the viewer’s vis-
But rather than being seen as either realistic, in the conventional 
sense, or abstract, in the sense of non-representational, Richter’s 
work can be better understood as “indeterminate” in the way so far 
described here. What the artist is trying to produce is a sense of uncer-
tainty, lack of fixedness, which draws the viewer in to try and resolve 
what they are seeing. Richter himself is very explicit about this, saying: 
“Pictures which are interpretable, and which contain a meaning, are 
bad pictures.” A good picture, on the other hand, “…demonstrates 
the endless multiplicity of aspects, it takes away our certainty, because 
it deprives a thing of its meaning and its name. It shows us the thing 
in all the manifold significance and infinite variety that preclude the 
emergence of any single meaning or view.” (Elger and Obrist, 2009, 
pp. 32–33). And in this exchange with the art critic Robert Storr he 
offers an insight into his own theory of indeterminate perception:
GR: I try to avoid something in the painting resembling a table or 
other things. It is terrible if it does because then all you can see is 
that object.
RS: So you allow for aspects or suggestions of images in the abstract 
work but not actual pictures?
GR: Not actual pictures. I just wanted to reemphasize my claim 
that we are not able to see in any other way. We only find paint-
ings interesting because we always search for something that looks 
familiar to us. I see something and in my head I compare it and 
try to find out what it relates to. And usually we do find those 
similarities and name them: table, blanket, and so on. When we do 
not find anything, we are frustrated and that keeps us excited and 
interested until we have to turn away because we are bored. That’s 
how abstract painting works…
RS: I am just saying that you use paintings as a way of making it 
difficult for people to read the image.
GR: Yes, that’s right.
(Storr, 2003, pp. 178–179).
What is evident from this brief survey of visual indeterminacy 
in art is that artists who make hard to decipher images are doing 
so not just to be wilfully obscure or to confound their audiences. 
They are also acting rather like vision scientists by exploring how 
certain kinds of images engage the visual system and how we make 
sense of the world. Moreover, by heightening our visual awareness, 
so certain artists believe, indeterminate images in their various 
forms can produce interesting, even revelatory, esthetic experiences.
creaTing indeTerminaTe images
Like the artists cited here, my initial interest in the phenomenon of 
visual indeterminacy was artistic. I became absorbed by the chal-
lenge of creating images, both still and moving, that could induce 
the same state of visual uncertainty in others that I had undergone 
myself when watching the Cabinet of Dr Caligari sequence. I tried 
many methods of achieving this using film, video, collage, fractal 
image generation, and digital image manipulation. In each case I 
was trying to produce a picture of sufficient complexity to strongly 
suggest the presence of some object or scene yet at the same deny 
easy or immediate identification. Figure 4 shows an early paper 
collage examples of these experiments. I soon found the problem of 
“trapping” the human visual system in this way much harder than I 
had first anticipated. As I now realize is well known to vision scien-
tists, the human visual system is extraordinarily effective at rapidly 
Figure 4 | Uncertainty 4, paper on card, 29 cm × 15 cm, 1992. An early 
attempt to create an indeterminate image using paper collage.
Figure 5 | The image on the left is a noisy texture that does not suggest 
any objects and so is effectively treated as abstract. The simple arrangement 
of two dots and a curve on the right show how readily we are able to recognize 
objects, even from the scantiest of clues. The problem of creating indeterminate 
images is how to avoid both these kinds of interpretation.
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reported this experience in positive terms, as interesting, or visually 
exciting, although some did tell me the images were “disturbing” 
or made them feel anxious.
This process of testing the indeterminacy effect of paintings 
on viewers was very useful as a way of confirming or refuting 
my own judgments about the way the images would be read. 
Those paintings I felt were more effective also tended to be the 
ual system while frustrating its capacity for recognition at the same 
time. After many years of experimentation I gradually   developed 
a method of drawing, and then painting, which seemed to pro-
duce this effect quite reliably. I discovered that by using a classical 
pictorial architecture, of the kind frequently found in European 
paintings made between the 1500s and early 1900s, I could create 
an image that incited strong expectations of recognizable objects 
and scenes. (This classical period was the epoch in figurative art 
that many people associate with recognizable depiction of forms, 
in contrast to later Modernism where artists turned increasingly to 
distortion and abstraction.) By using this overall pictorial structure 
but omitting, or otherwise manipulating those features of the image 
that would be readily recognized I was able to achieve a consistently 
indeterminate image. Some examples of these paintings are shown 
in Figures 6, 7, and 8.
In the early stages of making this work, the process of deciding 
what made a certain image successfully indeterminate in the terms 
described above was largely a matter of my personal judgment. I 
had to rely on my own reading of the image I was producing, and 
gage whether or not the forms in it were sufficiently evocative of 
objects or scenes, or whether they were too abstract or textural to 
incite the curiosity of the viewer. Increasingly I sought the opinions 
of others by showing the paintings in galleries or the studio and 
asking viewers to describe the processes occurring in their own 
minds as they studied the works. After doing this many times I 
found people tended to report they were having similar kinds of 
experiences. Their initial response was to think they were see-
ing a classical painting depicting a familiar theme, such as land-
scape, figure, or still life. But wherever they looked to find objects 
that would corroborate this initial response they failed to do so. 
They would fixate on an area in which they thought they saw a 
human limb or a piece of cloth, but would then realize that this 
was a false start, and would look for some other salient feature to 
pin their interpretation on. Many reported they were looking at 
certain forms within the images and sifting through the possible 
interpretations in their mind, testing various options in order to 
Figure 6 | Paralysis, Oil on panel, 27 cm × 33 cm, 2006. Private collection.
Figure 7 | Impulse, Oil on canvas, 80 cm × 70 cm, 2006. Collection of the 
University of Exeter.
Figure 8 | The Flight, Oil on paper, 30 cm × 40 cm, 2007. Private collection.
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deal of difficulty in finding the cow, although once I did it was very 
hard to see it as anything else. The experience I had prior to the 
point of recognition was similar, as I recall, to that occurring during 
the Cabinet of Dr Caligari sequence many years before. Both were 
marked by a sense of struggle in which various alternative interpre-
tations were tried out until the flash of recognition occurred. My 
interest in such images was less in the moment of recognition than 
the preceding process of object search, and what kinds of perceptual 
processes might be taking place during this time.
The perceptual state of visual indeterminacy occurring prior 
to the moment of recognition bears similarities to the rare neuro-
logical disorder of associative visual agnosia. A notable case study 
of this condition, presented by Humphreys and Riddoch (1987), 
concerned a patient, John, who had suffered a stroke resulting in 
a bilateral lesion in the region supplied by the posterior cerebral 
artery. Much of John’s capacity to see was spared, but his ability to 
recognize what he saw was greatly impaired. When shown a series 
of line drawings of everyday objects he was able to identify only a 
small proportion, and relied on “working out” what was depicted 
from specific clues within in the image, such as the curliness of a 
pig’s tail, rather than by seeing the object “as a whole” (p. 60). In 
arriving at their diagnosis of associative visual agnosia the authors 
ruled out other possible factors that could have contributed to 
John’s inability to recognize everyday objects, including any residual 
deficit in his stored knowledge or visual sensation. He showed no 
difficulty in recognizing objects by other means, such as touch, or 
describing them in detail from memory and was able to make quite 
accurate copies of drawings, albeit slowly. Figure 10 is a drawing 
made by John (on the right) copied from the picture of the owl (on 
the left). The authors note that John could quite accurately copy 
line drawings of objects, “…even when he had no idea what the 
same ones other people would report as having the strongest 
effect on them. But although useful in guiding my judgment, 
these viewer surveys were not carried out in any scientifically 
valid way. They were simply verbal reports elicited under a 
variety of conditions and recorded rather haphazardly. Having 
had a longstanding interest in the science of perception and 
visual consciousness I wondered if scientific methods could 
be usefully applied to study the effect I was investigating in 
a more systematic way. I also became increasingly interested 
in what science might have to say about the phenomenon of 
visual indeterminacy, and what effects the process of looking 
at indeterminate images might be having on the vision systems 
and brains of those looking at them.
scienTific background To visual indeTerminacy
As I started to look for scientific literature relating to visual inde-
terminacy it became clear this was a relatively lightly investigated 
area of perception compared, for example, to the related phenom-
enon of ambiguous or reversible images. Ambiguous images, such 
as the Necker cube, the Duck–Rabbit illusion, or the Boring vase, 
are distinguished by having alternating interpretations (the image is 
perceived either as a duck or a rabbit) each of which is quite deter-
minate (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998; Meng and Tong, 2004). Also well 
known are the issues around perceptual organization and so-called 
“hidden figures,” exemplified in R. C. James’ famous photograph of 
a Dalmatian dog in a dappled environment (Gregory, 1970; Palmer, 
1999; Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1999). These, and other similar 
“puzzle pictures,” direct the viewer to search for objects that are 
concealed in some way within the structure of the image, and once 
found then not easily lost. An example is the image of a cow first 
presented by Dallenbach (1951), a version of which is reproduced 
in Figure 9.
Figure 9 | This is an image of a cow, although most people are unable to 
see it at first glance, or even after prolonged study. Once seen, however it 
is very difficult to see the image as it appeared prior to the point of 
recognition. From American Journal of Psychology. Copyright 1951 by the 
Board of the University of Illinois. Used with permission of the author and the 
University of Illinois Press.
Figure 10 | The drawing on the right is the copy made by John, the 
patient with visual agnosia, of the drawing on the left. The fact that John 
could make this copy showed that his capacity to “see” was in tact, although 
he had no idea what it was he was copying. Reproduced by permission 
(©1987 Oxford University Press).
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component N400. They showed subjects sequences of recogniz-
able and unrecognizable gray scale pictures, the latter matching 
the former as closely as possible in terms of size, complexity, and 
structure. The results showed a marked increase in cooperation in 
certain parts of the brain and a greater degree of overall coherence 
between different regions during the viewing of unrecognizable 
pictures as compared with recognizable ones. This, they concluded, 
reflected the greater demands made on the viewer’s perceptual and 
cognitive resources and consequent “unease” involved in the task of 
semantically matching the undecipherable stimuli: “…the greater 
number of coherence increases for meaningless object processing 
suggests enhanced recruitment of more distributed left and right 
areas during unsuccessful memory search” (p. 1143). This finding 
seemed to corroborate my own sense of “unease” when confronted 
with an unrecognizable image, and the sense of mental struggle 
involved in trying to resolve the conundrum.
In another study that compared brain responses to recognizable 
and unrecognizable images, Rainer et al. (2004) measured neu-
ral activity in the V4 area when exposing the monkeys to images 
that were increasingly degraded, from clear to abstract noise. The 
monkeys learned to recognize familiar images that were degraded 
compared to novel ones that were treated in the same way. The 
researchers found that monkeys exposed to indeterminate images 
showed significantly increased neural activity in both primary and 
higher cortical areas of the brain than when faced with familiar 
or recognizable stimuli. From this Rainer and his team drew the 
conclusion that not only are particular loci in the brain recruited in 
response to indeterminate stimuli, but that the attempt to decipher 
such stimuli leads to enhanced overall coordination in brain activ-
ity: “This suggests that V4 plays a key role in resolving indeterminate 
visual inputs by coordinated interaction between bottom-up and 
top-down processing streams” (p. 275).
It was while presenting a lecture on indeterminate art at the 
Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics at Tübingen, at 
the invitation of Gregor Rainer, that I proposed a possible study in 
which the effects of looking at indeterminate paintings would be 
object was” (p. 69). To demonstrate this they point out that John 
faithfully reproduced the gap on the right side of the original owl’s 
head, not seeing it as an omission in the original drawing.
For Humphreys and Riddoch, John’s case suggests the normal 
processes of object recognition involve a number of operations 
that occur, to some extent, independently of each other but which 
can be broadly grouped into two layers (pp. 101–102). The first 
set of processes organize the perceptual “input” data according to 
position and orientation, and bind multiple visual elements into 
wholes. A subsequent set of processes then match that input data 
to associations about function and meaning. The authors conclude: 
“In general terms, (John’s) case supports the view that “perceptual” 
and “recognition” processes are separable…” (p. 104).
In her extensive study of visual agnosia Farah (2004) makes 
the same broad distinction between perceptual input and the con-
ceptual associations involved in visual object recognition. While 
stressing the non-serial, multidirectional processes in vision, she 
summaries: “Visual form agnosia validates the distinction implicit 
in the labels “early” and “intermediate” vision, on the one hand, 
and “high-level,” “object” vision on the other, by showing the first 
set of processes can continue to function when the second set is all 
but obliterated. It shows us a kind of richly elaborated but form-
less visual “stuff,” from which “things” can be derived” (p. 156). 
The phrase “richly elaborated but formless visual stuff” accurately 
describes the appearance of indeterminate images prior to the point 
of recognition. It is precisely the inability to match this “visual stuff” 
to one’s stored memories and associations that seems to character-
ize the visually indeterminate state. For most of us this can occur 
occasionally, but for the unfortunate sufferers of visual agnosia it 
is a permanent condition.
My hunch was that during the period where viewers are search-
ing for meaning among the pictorial clues something is occurring 
in their cognitive processing which is different from that occurring 
during normal recognition. This seemed to be supported by some 
scientific studies looking at brain responses to unrecognizable ver-
sus recognizable images. An experiment by Supp et al. (2005), for 
example, used EEG techniques to examine the changes in cortical 
Figure 11 | On the left is the painting Succulus (Oil on canvas, 123 cm × 123 cm, 2005) and on the right a detail from Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel ceiling. 
Both images have a similar visual structure and coloring, yet one is full of recognizable objects while the other is not.
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an art work and its physical appearance has been understood in 
terms of “content” and “form,” and this distinction has given rise to 
prolonged and often impassioned debate among theorists of art and 
esthetics as to which aspect is the more significant in determining 
the effect of an artwork and, indeed, whether the two aspects can 
really be distinguished at all (Bell, 1914). What this study suggested 
to me as an artist is that the distinction does have some validity 
given that the “formal” properties of the artworks seem to be a 
more significant factor in their degree of esthetic appreciation than 
“meaning” factors, at least over the short (4 s) viewing period used 
in the trials. The study also showed that subjects were significantly 
slower to make judgments about indeterminate paintings than they 
were about recognizable ones, whether they saw objects in them 
or not, which might suggest that the attempt to find objects in the 
indeterminate images requires a different kind or greater degree of 
underlying cognitive processing than when perceiving recognizable 
images. This seemed to corroborate the implications of the stud-
ies cited above, where viewing indeterminate images can lead to 
differential activity in certain areas of the brain. Crucially, though, 
there was a significant correlation between the length of time taken 
to determine whether or not images contained objects and rating 
of esthetic effect, such that the longer it took to make a decision, 
the more powerful the image was thought to be.
It is worth elaborating on the fact that the rating of esthetic effect 
employed in the study was slightly unusual. Rather than using a 
rating of “ugly to beautiful,” on the basis that esthetic experience 
is synonymous with the appreciation of beauty, we used one of 
“powerful affect” on a scale of 1–4, with 4 being the most power-
ful. The reason was that, as even a cursory glance at art history will 
show, the esthetic impact of a work of art is not necessarily linked 
to how beautiful, pleasurable, harmonious, or pleasant it is. Some 
of the most impressive art works can be quite ugly, disturbing, 
distorted, or dissonant. One thinks of Goya’s Saturn Devouring his 
Son (1823, Prado, Spain), Picasso’s Mother and Child (1907, Musée 
Picasso, Paris), or the Chapman brother’s Hell (1999–2000, Saatchi 
Collection, London). The use of the term “powerful” arguably more 
accurately captures the range of emotions felt by an audience in 
response to a work of art and is therefore more objective as a meas-
ure of affect than the more limited category of beauty alone. The 
fact that from this study it appears increased recognition latencies 
are associated with an increase in the “powerfulness” rating of the 
image indicates that the amount of struggle or effort needed to 
comprehend an image has some positive relationship to its esthetic 
value. This was also something I had intuitively suspected, based 
on my own esthetic experiences of indeterminate artworks and 
the fact that such images are so often revered in the canon of art.
Although firm deductions cannot be drawn from this single 
study, it seems that the experiments described above, coupled with 
the subjective reports I gathered from viewers when making the 
works, give good reason to believe that something is happening in 
the case of viewing indeterminate art works that is not happening 
with immediately recognizable ones. I know my own experiences 
of seeing indeterminate images, whether art works or not, to be 
moments of great vividness and highly focused attention, where 
the habitual operations of recognition are fleetingly suspended as 
the mind struggles to resolve the components of the image into 
compared to paintings that looked similar but contained recogniz-
able objects. To demonstrate this I showed a painting of my own 
next to a detail of Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel ceiling (Figure 11).
My painting had a similar visual structure and colors as the 
Michelangelo, but omitted any clearly discernable objects, such 
as people or clothing. Working on the basis of the intuitive hunch 
noted above, I proposed that comparing the brain activity of sub-
jects exposed to these similar images might reveal some useful 
information about the processes involved in object recognition. 
It happened that in the audience were two scientists who offered, 
in different ways, to carry out tests using my paintings as stimuli, 
which led to several collaborative studies being undertaken on art 
and visual indeterminacy.
scienTific experimenTs on visual indeTerminacy
Working with the neuroscientist Alumit Ishai, and her team at the 
Department of Neuroradiology in the University of Zürich, I cre-
ated a set of stimuli that included a selection of my own paintings, 
all of them in the indeterminate classical style described above, and 
the same number of paintings made by other artists, which had 
a similar visual appearance but were full of recognizable objects. 
These included works by artists such as Turner, Tintoretto, Rubens, 
Michelangelo, and Fuseli among others. Some samples can be seen 
online at: http://www.robertpepperell.com/Stimuli/Stimuli.html. 
These stimuli were divided equally into monochrome and color 
sets, and then presented in a number of behavioral experiments. 
Subjects with no specialist art training were shown the stimuli in 
random order and asked to perform a number of tasks, includ-
ing deciding whether each image contained familiar objects (a 
measure of object recognition) and how powerfully the images 
affected them (a measure of esthetic response). Scientific details 
of the experiments and the results can be found in the published 
paper (Ishai et al., 2007) but I’d like to reflect here on some of the 
findings that I found surprising and interesting from an artistic 
point of view.
One of the unexpected results concerned the extent to which 
subjects reported seeing familiar objects in my indeterminate 
paintings. Given that I had striven so hard to remove any trace 
of recognizable objects, leaving only strong suggestions, it was 
interesting to discover that people were claiming to see things they 
recognized on average 24% of the time. (It was less surprising to 
me that the effect was stronger with the color images compared 
with the monochrome as I had always found it easier to create 
the effect of visual indeterminacy when making monochrome 
paintings; it is noticeable how readily a pinkish hue will suggest 
flesh or a bluish hue sky.) As one might expect, subjects reported 
seeing familiar objects in the other artists’ work almost 100% of 
the time. It was also notable that the subjects gave almost identi-
cal scores for esthetic affect across all the paintings in the study, 
regardless of how recognizable they were. What this seems to 
indicate is that, in rating their esthetic response, the subjects were 
less influenced by the literal meaning of the images they saw than 
the immediate visual impact of the shapes, colors, and composi-
tion. This is despite the fact that previous studies have shown a 
tendency for non-art trained audiences to prefer pictures they 
can recognize more than abstract ones (Healey and Enns, 2002; 
Vartanian and Goel, 2004).
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reported seeing objects in images that did not contain them, even 
more so than in the one cited previously, is evidence of the invol-
untary impulse we have to turn the rich and complex visual data 
around us into meaningful things. As the paper concluded: “Our 
findings indicate that this seemingly effortless process (of recogni-
tion) occurs not only with familiar objects, but also with indeter-
minate stimuli that do not contain real objects. It therefore seems 
that the primate brain is a compulsory object viewer, namely that 
it automatically segments indeterminate visual input into coherent 
images.” (p. 929) This helps to explain why indeterminate images 
can be so compelling.
Separate studies conducted by Wallraven et al. (2007a,b) at 
the Max Planck Institute used the same indeterminate paintings 
employed in the previous studies, but this time subjected them to a 
range of psychophysical tests using eye-tracking and categorization 
tasks. The purpose was to look at the ways subjects would react to 
indeterminate stimuli, and also to see if there were any empirical 
grounds for verifying my own intentions in making my art. Having 
worked so long to make successfully indeterminate paintings on the 
basis of intuition, guesswork, and the informally acquired reports 
of others, it was again fascinating for me as an artist to see what 
more rigorous and objective measures might reveal about, quite 
literally, how people looked at the work.
In one set of behavioral experiments, my indeterminate paintings 
and the visually similar representational paintings were submitted to 
a range of tests looking at subjects’ responses to variations in size and 
orientation. They also undertook a categorization task where par-
ticipants were asked to classify the images into one of seven genres, 
which were “Biblical scenes,” “Landscapes with person,” “Landscape 
without a person,” ”Portrait,” ”Still life,” “Battle scene,” and “None 
of the above.” In another experiment, participants were shown the 
sequence of indeterminate images and, in addition to the catego-
rization task above, were also asked to identify whether or not the 
images contained people, during both of which their eye-tracking 
movements were recorded. Again the scientific details can be con-
sulted in the relevant papers, but two outcomes were of particular 
interest to me as the originator of the indeterminate stimuli.
First, the analysis of the data produced by the experiments 
seemed to verify my intentions in making the indeterminate images. 
Wallraven et al. (2007a) proposed generally that visual informa-
tion can be ordered along two parameter dimensions, namely 
“abstract/representational” and “unique/ambiguous.” Images that 
score highly on the “unique” parameter are very distinct in meaning, 
whether they are abstract (as in the case of certain symbols or icons) 
or representational (as in the case of photographs or photorealistic 
paintings). Images that are rated as being more “ambiguous” may 
be almost entirely non-representational (as in the case of certain 
abstract art) or have multiple meanings (as in the case of certain 
optical illusions or surrealist artworks). These two parameter 
dimensions also function on two distinct layers which normally 
operate together in visual perception: the perceptual layer, which 
broadly speaking is the same “bottom-up” or “lower-level” set of 
processes involved in organizing visual data described above in the 
section on visual agnosia, and the conceptual layer, which consists 
in the “higher-level” or “top-down” information retrieved from 
stored memories and associations (Figure 12).
something meaningful. This is by no means a straightforwardly 
pleasurable experience; it can sometimes be quite frustrating or 
disorienting, and not immediately rewarding. In esthetic terms, 
however, I regard the experience as being of great value, since for 
a few moments I am acutely aware of the visual form of the scene 
before me in a way I am not when the image is semantically deter-
mined. This, then, might be thought of as part of the heightened 
mode of perceptual experience associated with indeterminate 
images, and may help to explain why artists over the centuries 
have been so frequently drawn to making them.
A follow-up study used neuroimaging techniques to look at 
the activity in subjects’ brains while viewing the same stimuli 
plus another set of artworks that were entirely abstract, that is, 
with no suggestion of objects at all (Fairhall and Ishai, 2008). Also 
included were scrambled images that were essentially visual noise. 
The study was design to test the prediction that abstract, indeter-
minate, and recognizable images would produce a “posterior-to-
anterior gradient of activation along the ventral visual pathway, 
with stronger response to abstract compositions in inferior occipital 
gyrus; stronger response to indeterminate paintings in interme-
diate regions in posterior fusiform gyrus; and stronger response 
to representational paintings in anterior fusiform gyrus” (p. 925). 
Using a similar object recognition task as employed in the previous 
study, the behavioral data recorded in the scanner revealed an even 
stronger propensity for subjects to report seeing familiar objects 
in my indeterminate paintings (now 36% of the time). They even 
reported seeing familiar objects in the abstract paintings 18% of 
the time, even though these had been chosen specifically for their 
lack of object-suggestive content. As expected, there were almost 
no reports of objects being seen in the scrambled images.
In neuroscientific terms, the results were able to partially con-
firm the hypothesis, and again I only want to comment here on 
some of the interesting implications the study had for me as an 
artist. It was gratifying for me to know, for example, that based 
on the data in this study at least there is a detectable “indetermi-
nacy effect” produced in subjects when looking at my paintings. By 
comparing the level of activation between the scrambled paintings 
and my own there was a significant differentiation in certain brain 
areas (precuneus and medial frontal gyrus), which were described 
in the paper as the “neural correlates of object indeterminacy.” Once 
again, subjects took longer to decide on the question of whether the 
images contained familiar objects or not in the indeterminate and 
abstract paintings compared to the recognizable ones, which sug-
gests a more effortful process is going on when judging ambiguous 
or suggestive imagery. But I was slightly surprised that the effect of 
seeing indeterminate images on recordable brain activation was less 
pronounced than I had expected. In my naivety about the way the 
brain works, and what the scanning process is able to detect, I had 
anticipated a far stronger degree of differential activation during 
the exposure to indeterminate images as compared to recognizable 
ones than was found.
But the study did confirm one of my other intuitively held beliefs 
about the way we perceive the visual world. Part of my anxiety, or 
unease, during the moment of indeterminate perception in the 
Cabinet of Dr Caligari sequence arose from the sense of compul-
sion I felt to make sense of what was in front of me. I have felt the 
same many times since when unexpectedly confronted with an 
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clues in art, such as titles or hanging context, might affect the way 
audiences look at works of art. It also alerted me to how important 
the use of titles might be in my own work in leading the “eye” of 
the viewer as they try to interpret the image.
The question of how titles affect the interpretations of  paintings 
stimulated the final art–science collaborative study I wish to men-
tion (Wiesmann and Ishai, 2010). The study used a selection of 
Cubist paintings made by the artists Pablo Picasso, Georges Braque, 
and Juan Gris in the period before First World War. Cubist paint-
ings of this period are characterized as being highly indetermi-
nate in so far as they are directly observed depictions of everyday 
objects – tables, fruit, newspapers, glasses, etc., – but represented 
in a fragmented and “exploded” manner that makes immediate 
identification very difficult. Art experts, and others familiar with the 
genre, are able to “read” these Cubist scenes and find within them 
the various forms and objects from which they are constructed. But 
those without this expertise tend to see only patterns, lines, and 
textures rather than distinct objects of any kind (Golding, 1988).
One part of the study looked at the extent to which descriptive 
titles presented alongside Cubist paintings affected the viewer’s 
capacity to identify objects in the scene. Crucially, however, half the 
subjects undergoing the task of detecting familiar objects received a 
short training session before the trial in which they were instructed 
on how to “read” Cubist paintings and find objects in them. The 
study gathered both behavioral and fMRI data, and again the sci-
entific methods and results are available in the published paper. 
Samples of the stimuli can be seen at: http://www.robertpepperell.
com/Cubism/index.html. What was surprising from my own per-
spective was the extent to which the “trained” subjects differed from 
the control group in terms of the number of objects recognized. 
Despite the fact that the subjects were not art experts and received 
only a relatively brief training sessions (30 min) they were signifi-
cantly better than the control group in recognizing familiar objects. 
The study also found that the role of the descriptive titles, which 
effectively declared what the paintings depicted, has little effect 
on the control group but a marked effect in helping the trained 
group to find more familiar objects. To me, as both an artist and 
art teacher, these results were somewhat counterintuitive inasmuch 
as: (a) I would have expected the process of learning to read Cubist 
paintings to be something only acquired over many hours of study 
rather than the brief period of training undergone by these subjects, 
and (b) that meaningful titles would have had some positive effect 
on helping those with no training to find familiar objects more 
often than when looking at the same image only accompanied by 
the word “Untitled,” as was the case here. The study also showed 
enhanced activation in the parahippocampal cortex of the trained 
subjects, the amplitude of which increased as a function of the 
number of objects recognized. This suggested that the subjects 
had used broader contextual associations to identify the objects in 
the paintings rather than the cognitive resources normally linked 
more specifically to object recognition. It is also tempting to won-
der whether subjects thus trained in recognizing objects in Cubist 
paintings are also then better at other object recognition tasks, 
and indeed whether learning to understand Cubist art can actually 
improve cognitive performance in other areas; it would certainly 
be good news for art lovers if that were the case.
As someone interested in the way we perceive images, this 
“map” of what the authors called the visual “interpretation space” 
is extremely useful as a way of organizing the different variables 
that can influence the way an image is read. On could imagine, for 
example, using it to visualize the whole history of recognizability 
visual art, and thereby track the shifting patterns of taste across the 
centuries. When this same parameterization was applied to my own 
paintings by the team it was expected that in order to fulfill my ambi-
tion to make works that were neither fully recognizable nor fully 
abstract they would need to be assessed as being located roughly in 
the center–right of the graph, that is, avoiding the extremes of each 
parameter, but tending toward ambiguity. Once the genre categori-
zation tasks had been carried out the results showed that the images 
were indeed distributed around a “region of indeterminacy” at the 
center of the graph, with a bias toward to ambiguous end of the axis. 
For the experimenters, this data offered a perceptual validation of 
the artistic program behind the work. It was also interesting to note 
that, as with the previous studies cited, subjects reported a relatively 
high percentage (37%) of my images as being “representational,” 
despite the lack of any clear objects being depicted.
The other interesting finding from these experiments from my 
perspective concerned the differences in eye movements the par-
ticipants displayed when engaged in the person finding task as 
compared with the genre categorization task. What surprised me 
was the extent to which the fixation maps varied between the two 
tasks, even though subjects were looking at the same images. As has 
been known since the time of the early eye-tracking experiments 
by Yarbus (1967) how one looks at a image is critically dependent 
on what is being looked for. While this is clearly well known to 
scientists it is not, as far as I am aware, something generally known 
to artists. Yet is clearly a fundamental aspect of the way we appre-
hend the world, which presumably reflects the way expectation and 
meaning are mediated by the visual system in general and the brain 
Figure 12 | Schematic representation of the pictorial “interpretation space” 
(Wallraven et al. 2007a) representing the “abstract/representational” and 
“unique/ambiguous” parameter dimensions existing of both perceptual 
and conceptual layers of vision. Indeterminate images occupy the area 
between representational and abstract and between unique and ambiguous 
parameters, but tending toward the ambiguous end of the axis.
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art–science integration, Zeki (1999, p. 217), said in his seminal book 
on the subject: “My aim in writing this book has been really to convey 
my feeling that esthetic theories will only become intelligible and 
profound once based on the workings of the brain…” While he has 
been careful elsewhere to insist he is studying the neural correlates 
of experiences like beauty and not necessarily the causes (Kawabata 
and Zeki, 2004), there is a understandable temptation to assume 
that some of our most uniquely human experiences, such as art 
appreciation, might be explicable purely in terms of certain kinds of 
brain activity. It is worth noting in this context a growing tendency 
within philosophy and psychology toward “externalist” models of 
perception and cognition. These models, to varying degrees, deny or 
resist the idea that the brain is the sole location of mental properties 
such as beliefs, memories, and even the mind itself (Noë, 2005, 2009; 
Clark, 2008; Hurley, 2008; Velmans, 2008). Allied to this is the fact 
that many artists and art theorists, when discussing the matter, seem 
to intuitively support the idea that mental properties and esthetic 
experiences extend beyond the head and into the world (Pepperell, 
2011). The purpose of raising this issue here is to point out that 
certain basic assumptions about how esthetic experiences might be 
constituted can differ fundamentally between those making the art 
and those studying its biological effects. In order to achieve a fuller 
understanding of what the brain contributes to esthetic experience 
as a whole we will need to reconcile these divergent approaches.
This leads to the final point, which concerns the need to recognize 
how great the disciplinary gulf still is between art and science, despite 
all the work done in recent times to bridge it. I have been attending 
science conferences now for over 10 years, and working closely with 
scientists on and off for about five. In that time I have rarely found 
members of the scientific community to be anything other than 
generous with their time and ideas, politely inquisitive about my 
proposals, and forgiving of my own naivety about their specialisms. 
Even so, I am also constantly reminded of how different the basic 
conceptual categories can be between the arts and sciences, a cultural 
divide of the kind famously identified by Snow (1993) in the middle 
of the last century and still largely in force today. The difference is 
in part, I believe, born from the need for scientists to be explicit, 
analytical, and logical in their working and reporting processes. 
Quite often for artists the opposite is the case, their training and 
traditions having implanted in them a proclivity toward vagueness, 
synthesis, and irrationality. The Cubist painter Braque (1971) was 
fond of saying: “Art is meant to disturb; science reassures.”
Finding common ground between two such distinct traditions 
is not always straightforward. It was somewhat sobering for me to 
discover that the constraints on the experimental equipment used 
in the collaborative fMRI study cited above required the subjects 
to express their esthetic appreciation for the artworks on a scale 
between 1 and 4. For those schooled in the infinite subtleties of 
artistic expression the idea that the merits of a great Turner or 
Rubens painting could be judged on such a crude scale and in 
as brief a moment as 3 or 4 s would border on the absurd. Yet if 
we are to make any progress at all in understanding art using the 
empirical methods of scientific enquiry these are exactly the kinds 
of procedures we will have to adopt, at least until more sensitive 
techniques of investigation become available. Just as I have had to 
modify my expectations about what empirical techniques are able 
arT, science, and The brain
The various investigations I have undertaken with neuroscientists 
and psychophysicists have proved illuminating and rewarding from 
my artistic perspective. I initially set out to discover what science 
might be able to tell me about the specific issue of visual inde-
terminacy, and how people respond to my paintings. In doing so 
I have gained an enormous amount of insight into the way the 
visual system operates, how the brain functions, and indeed how 
science itself operates when investigating these phenomena. I have 
become aware of the great potential of the scientific method to 
elucidate processes that artists often work with intuitively but rarely 
grasp in any systematic way. But I have also seen at first hand the 
limitations of the scientific method when studying the experience 
of art, and have been reminded of the very different cultures that 
exist between art and science that make meaningful collaboration 
a sometimes demanding process. In the final section of this paper I 
want to briefly reflect on these issues and how future joint research 
between artists and scientists might benefit from these experiences.
In the first place, it is important to acknowledge the inherent 
limitations of the scientific method when investigating the way we 
perceive art – at least as they appear from an artist’s view. It often 
goes unremarked, for example, that most if not all lab-based studies 
of audience responses to art will use reproductions instead of real 
works of art. Reproductions are not always of the highest quality, and 
cannot be shown in a way that properly reflects the physical properties 
of the work itself. When preparing the images for the Cubism study, 
for instance, it was necessary to conform all the images to the same 
scale and format due to the demands of the experimental procedure. 
This meant a lot of cropping and resizing, which resulted in the loss 
of size discrimination between large and small paintings. And there is 
the broader question of how valid it is to measure the effects artworks 
on the basis of reproductions at all. Some empirical esthetics studies 
have shown significant differences in the judged hedonic or pleasure 
value of original artworks compared to reproductions (Locher et al., 
2001). Certainly any serious scholar of art would make a point of 
examining the real work before arriving at any definitive evaluation 
of its esthetic impact. Many qualities inherent in a work of art simply 
do not covert into photographic media, including scale, degree of 
surface gloss, texture of brushwork, or the way that certain colors can 
change depending on the angle of viewing (as is the case, for example, 
in many paintings by the abstract artist Ad Reinhardt). All these are 
crucial esthetic properties that artists work hard to control, and their 
absence or impoverishment in conventional photographic reproduc-
tions restricts what many lab-based studies can tell us about the expe-
rience of looking at them. Then, of course, there are all the well-known 
problems associated with subjects being placed in fMRI scanners, with 
the distracting noise and discomfort they create (Cooke et al., 2007). 
Something similar, but less intrusive, is true of eye-tracking devices 
that require the head to be locked in a stable position – something 
that clearly would not happen in a natural gallery setting. While these 
limitations do not, in my view, diminish the value of such studies they 
should perhaps be more frequently acknowledged when discussing 
the implications of the results.
Another issue that those wishing to study the effects of art on 
the brain might want to consider is the risk of what might be called 
“neuro-determinism,” that is, the expectation that esthetic experi-
ence can be fully accounted for in terms of brain-centered processes. 
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willing to adjust their disciplinary spectacles in order to appreciate 
the relatively chaotic point of view of an artist. The result has been, 
from my point of view, a deeper understanding of what science can 
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enriched through the process, rather than one being parasitic on the 
other. There is always a risk that the compromises necessary to make 
progress are made at the expense of the essential values and outlooks 
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